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890 WJRIN V. PARKER [48 C.2d 
fL. A. No. 24053. In Bank. Aug. 6, 1957.] 
A. L. WIRIN, Appellant, v. WILLIAM H. PARKER, as 
Chief of Police, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Use of Dictographs.-Where a city 
chief of police authorized and directed the installation, mainte-
nance or use of dictographs by regular salaried police offieers 
in a house, apartment, room, offiee, store, bar, jail eell, or other 
place of oecupancy, either without the consent, knowledge, 
permission or authority of some person having a property in-
terest in such property or plaee, or without the knowledge, 
consent, permission or authority of some person present during 
such installation, or during such maintenance or during such 
use, he authorized and directed dictograph surveillance in 
violation of U.S. Const., 4th and 14th Amendments, and Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 19. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction 
Against illegal Expenditures.-Under Code Civ. Pree., § 526a, 
providing that a mnnicipal taxpayer may maintain an action 
to restrain the expenditure of public funds for illegal purposes, 
it is immaterial that the amount of the illegal expenditures is 
small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving 
of tax funds. 
[3] Public Officers-Duties.-Public officials must themselves obey 
the law. 
[4] Municipa.! Corporations-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction 
Against illegal Expenditures.-Expediency cannot justify the 
denial of an injunction against the expenditure of public funds 
in violation of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and invasion of privacy. 
[6] ld.-Remedies of Taxpayers-Injunction Against mega.! Ex-
penditures.-An injunction against the expenditure of publics 
funds to defray the cost of entry into or upon private prem-
ises without the consent of a possessor thereof for the purpose 
of secreting a microphone or other sound transmission equip-
ment secretly to overhear or record sounds coming therefrom 
could be. understood and obeyed and would not inhibit lawful 
police activity. 
[1] See Ca.!.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et Beq.; Am.J'ur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
[2] See Ca.1.J'ur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 555. 
McK. Dig. Referencea-: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2, 4:-8] 
Municipal Corporations, § 478; [3] Publie Officers, 150. 
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[6] Id.-Remedies of Ta.xpayers--Injunction Against nlegaJ Ex-
penditures.-In an action by a municipal taxpayer against the 
tlhief of police to enjoin illegal expenditure of public funds 
to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed micro-
phones (Code Civ. Proe., § 526a), where the evidence and de-
fendant's pleading were to the effect that defendant intended 
to continue the illegal conduct, if an injunction be denied on the 
defendant's assertion that there is no threat of future illegal 
expenditures, plaintiff is entitled to a reversal in order to meet 
that issue and secure a clear finding thereon. 
APPEAL from 8 judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enjoin chief of police from expending public 
funds to conduct police surveillance by means of concealed 
microphones. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
A. L. Wirin, in pro. per., Fred Okrand and Nathan L. 
Schoichet for Appellant. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke 
Jones, Alan G. Campbell and James A. Doherty, Assistant 
City Attorneys, and Ralph J. Eubank, Deputy City Attorney. 
for Respondent. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintifi', a resident citizen taxpayer of 
the City of Los Angeles, brought this action against defend-
ant as chief of police of the city to enjoin the alleged illegal 
expenditure of public funds to conduct police surveillance 
by means of concealed microphones. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a.) 
Pursuant to stipulation the matter was submitted on the 
pleadings, affidavits, and depositions. The trial court made 
findings of fact and conClusions of law and entered judgment 
for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. 
Plaintiff contends that undisputed facts found by the trial 
court establish his right to injunctive relief. The trial court 
found that" Since his appointment and qualification as Chief 
of Police of the City of Los Angeles, the defendant in such 
capacity has authorized and directed the installation, mainte-
nance and use of diSltographs by regular salaried police officers 
) 
) 
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of the Los Angeles Pol icc Department, but only when in 
his sole discretion such use and installation has been neces-
sary in the performance of their duties in detecting crimi"' 
and in the apprehension of criminals. In so doing defendant 
has acted in good faith and has in good faith believed that 
he was acting in the lawful discharge of his official duties." 
Acts authorized by defendant have "embraced the follow-
ing: 1. The concealmcnt by a police officer in the place con-
cerned of a microphone, or other sound transmission device, 
in such manner that it may receive sounds within the range 
of its capabilities. 2. The provision of means whereby sounds 
received by such microphones are transmitted to a place where 
a police officer may and does hear and record such sounds. 
The defendant has not authorized or directed any dictograph 
installation, nor has any police officer of the City of Los 
Angeles, acting pursuant to the authorization or direction 
of defendant, installed, maintained or used any dictograph 
installation, except where the defendant and such officers 
had at all times reasonable caUSe to believe that persons under 
surveillanlle by such means had committed crimes or planned 
and intended the commission of crimes, or that information 
thus obtained would aid in the detection or prevention of 
crime, or that information thus obtained would assist in 
the apprehension of fugitives or other criminals. In one or 
more of such instances, but not in all of them, the installa-
tion, maintenance or use of dictographs by regular salaried 
police officers .•• , pursuant to the authorization and direc-
tion of the defendant, have been in a house, apartment, room, 
office, store, bar, jail cell, or other place of occupancy, either 
without the consent, knowledge, permission or authority of 
some person having a property interest in such property or 
place, or without the knowledge, consent, permission or au-
thority of some person present during such installation, or 
during such maintenance or during such use. The installa-
tion, maintenance or use of dictograph equipment without 
the knowledge, consent, permission or authority of each such 
person has been effected only where the defendant and such 
police officers, acting pursuant to the authorization or direc-
tion of defendant, believed in good faith and upon probable 
cause that knowledge of the surveillance on the part of such 
person would destroy the value and purpose of such installa-
tion. " The court a~o found that dictograph surveillance 
as authorized and directed by defendant was necessary for 
the prevention or' punishment of certain felonies and aia-
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demeanors, and that although funds "of the City of Los 
Angeles have been expended by defendant to defray the cost 
of the equipment and of the personnel time" involved, the 
"amount of such expenditures is neither large nor substan-
tial, and the use of such means of necessary surveillance 
reduces the cost of the police work involved below what would 
be required in efforts to achieve similar purposes by other 
means. As of July 2, 1952, the date on which the answer of 
the defendant to the amended complaint was filed, the defend-
ant was continuing, and proposed and intended thereafter 
to continue, the authorization and direction of such uses of 
sound transmission equipment by regular salaried police 
officers of the City of Los Angeles when the installation, 
maintenance and use of such equipment should be necessary 
in his sole discretion in the performance of the duties of the 
defendant and of such officers in preventing and detecting 
crime and in the apprehension of criminals. • . . There is 
no threatened or actual irreparable injury to the plaintiff or to 
any other taxpayer, or to the general public of the City of 
Los Angeles, by any substantial waste of funds of the said 
city in connection with the installation, maintenance or use 
of dictograph equipment as described herein. There is no 
impending or threatened injury to the plaintiff or to any tax-
payer or to the general public of the City of Los Angeles by 
reason of any future or threatened authorization in such 
connection by the defendant or by reason of any future or 
threatened installation, maintenance or use of dictograph 
equipment by any police officer of the Los Angeles Police 
department acting pursuant to such future or threatened 
authorization. " 
[1] It is clear from the finding that "In one or more of 
such instances, but not in all of them, the installation, main-
tenance or use of dictographs by regular salaried police offi-
cers .•• , have been in a house, apartment, room, office, 
store, bar, jail cell, or other place of occupancy, either without 
the consent, knowledge, permission or authority of some person 
having a property interest in such property or place, or 
without the knowledge, consent, permission or authority of 
some person present during such installation, or during such 
maintenance or during such use," that defendant has au-
thorized and directed dictograph surveillance in violation of 
the provisions of the United States Constitution (4th and 14th 
Amendments) ~nd the California Constitution (art. I, § 19; 
I.-viM T. California, 347 U.S. 128 (74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 
) 
) 
) 
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561]; People v. Cahan,« Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]; People 
v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590 [290 P.2d 505]), and that as of 
July 2, 1952, he intended to continue so doing. Moreover, 
it appears from his answer and evidenee before the trial court 
that at least before the decision in the Irvine ease in 1954, 
defendant took the position that all of his activities in this 
respect were lawful, and he candidly alleged in his answer 
that the consent of the "owner, oecupant,or lessee of the 
premises" upon which installations were made was not sought 
or obtained "when there is reason to believe that ••• knowl-
edge on the part of such person mayor will destroy the 
value of an installation as an aid in the apprehension of crimi-
nals and the prevention or detection of crime." 
[2] The Code of Civil Procedure, section 526a, provides 
that plaintiff may maintain an action to restrain the expendi-
ture of public funds for illegal purposes. It is immaterial 
that the amount of the illegal expenditures is small or that 
the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds. 
(Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 279-280 [257 P. 530]; Crowe 
v. Boyle, 184 Cal. 117, 121 [193 P. 111]; Osburn v. 8tone, 170 
Cal. 480,484 [150 P. 367]; Santa Rosa Lighting Co. v. Wood-
ward, 119 Cal. 30, 34 [50 P. 1025] ; Barry v. Goad, 89 Cal. 215, 
222-223 [26 P. 785] ; Winn v. Shaw, 87 Cal. 631, 637 [25 P. 
968] ; Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 208 [300 P.2d 
119] ; Trickey v. Oity of Long Beach, 101 Ca1.App.2d 871, 881 
[226 P.2d 694]; Winn v. Horrall, 85 Cal.App.2d 497,504-506 
[193 P.2d 470] ; Brown v. Boyd, 33 Cal.App.2d 416, 418 [91 
P.2d 926] ; see Simpson v. Oity of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271, 
276 [253 P.2d 464].) [3] It is elementary that public officials 
must themselves obey the law. [4] It has been expressly held in 
this state that expediency cannot justify the denial of an in-
junction against the expenditure of public funds in violation of 
the constitutional guarantees here involved. (Win'll v. Horrall, 
s'U,pra, 85 Cal.App.2d 497, 504.506.) It bears emphasis that 
none of the arguments marshalled in People v. Cahan, supra, 
44 Ca1.2d 434, against the adoption of the exclusionary rule 
are here applicable. Plaintiff seeks to enforce directly the 
constitutional provisions to preclude the problem of the Cahan 
case. Indeed, the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment by 
contempt proceedings against overzealous officers was advo· 
cated as an alternative to the exclusionary rule by one of its 
ablest and severest critics (see 8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d 
ed.] § 2184, p. 40).,1lDd the dissenting opinion in the Cahan 
case stressed the argumentE for a direct rather than indirect 
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method of enforcing the constitutional guarantees that would 
not deprive H 'society of its remedy against one lawbreaker 
because he has been pursued by another.'" (44 OaL2d 434, 
458.) 
Defendant nevertheless contends that the scope of the 
constitutional prohibitions is so uncertain that an injunction 
against their violation would either be too vague to be en-
forced or would operate to deter the police from permissible 
and essential activity for fear of transgressing its limits. He 
also contends that the court cannot determine in advance 
the reasonableness of police surveillance, which turns on the 
facts of the particular case. Plaintiff, however, does not seek 
an injunction against all unconstitutional police activities, 
nOr does he ask the court to define in advance precisely what 
defendant could or could not do in all contingencies. His 
primary concern is to prevent repetitions of police conduct 
held to fall clearly within the constitutional prohibitions in 
the Irvine, Oahan, and Tarantino cases. Whether or not 
there may be other circumstances in which eavesdropping by 
the use of concealed microphones to record private conversa-
tions is violative of the constitutional guarantees, the conduct 
condemned in those cases is easily defined. Defendant himself 
now contends that he is complying with. those decisions. 
[5] An injunction against the expenditure of public funds 
to defray the cost of the entry into or upon private premises 
without the consent of a possessor thereof for the purpose 
of secreting a microphone or other sound transmission equip-
ment secretly to overhear or record sounds coming therefrom 
could easily be understood and obeyed and would in no way 
inhibit lawful police activity. 
[6] Since the court found that in the past defendant 
believed in good faith that he was acting in the lawful dis-
charge of his official duties, and since he now states in his 
brief that he is complying with the rule of the Irvine case, 
he contends that we should -assume that he will not engage 
in the questioned conduet . and that an injunction is there-
fore unnecessary. The evidence and defendant's pleading 
before the trial court were to the effect, however, that defend-
ant intended to continue the illegal conduct, and although it 
related to his intention before the Irvine case was decided, 
the matter was not argued or submitted until several months 
thereafter. He did not amend his answer or introduce evidence 
that his intentions had changed, and the only, finding with 
respect to his intentions was that as of July 2, 1952, prior 
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to the Irvine decision, he intended to continue to engage in 
constitutionally prohibited conduct. Under these circum-
sta.nces, if an injunction is to be denied on the ground that 
there is no threat of future illegal expenditures, plaintiff is 
entitled to meet that issue and secure a clear finding thereon. 
(Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Ca1.2d 818,830 [151 P.2d 260] ; see 
Sacre v. Ohalupnik, 188 Cal. 386, 390 [205 P. 449].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
Under the guise of protecting the public treasury the plain-
tiff would prevent the purchase of equipment which may be 
used for a lawful purpose. Assuming that it might be used 
also for an unlawful purpose it is neverthele::.s in the same 
category as firearms which may be so used but whose employ-
ment in the enforcement of the law is absolutely essential. 
It is cOll(,eded by the majority that the plaintiff's primary 
concern is to prevent repetitions of police conduct held to 
fall within the constitutional prohibitions in the Irvine (Irvine 
v. OaJ,ifornia, 347 U.S. 128 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561]), 
Cahan (People v. Oahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]) and 
Tarantino (People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590 [290 P.2d 505] ) 
cases. Such a sweeping injunction is beyond the power of a 
court to impose and constitutes an attempt by judicial action 
to impose restraints on other branches of the government in 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
It is provided by statute that an injunction will not lie 
to "prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of 
the law for the public benefit." (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, 
subd. 4 j see also Civ. Code, § 3423.) Certainly the execution 
of the statutes embodied in the Penal Code is "for the public 
benefit. " 
Furthermore, even if an injunction would lie to accomplish 
the purpose sought by the plaintiff nothing in the present 
record justifies a determination that there is a threat that 
the defendant chief of police is now engaged, or will engage, 
in any unlawful activity. At all stages in this proceeding 
he has made it clearly understood that he has intended and 
intends to comply with the law. The plaintiff concedes that 
the chief has acted at all times in good faith in this respect. 
The record IihQwi that the type of microphone installations 
) 
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held to be illegal in the Irvine and Cahan cases were utilized 
by the ehief only prior to those decisions and at a time when 
such installations were held by our courts to be proper means 
of police detection. It was not until almost two years after 
the filing of his answer in this case that the decision in the 
Irvine case for the first time put him on notice that such con-
duct might be improper. The defendant asserts, without 
contradiction, that he has not since that time employed such 
devices in a prohibited fashion. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that he will not comply with the law. The 
court should give consideration to his conceded good faith. 
Until a specific violation is threatened there is no reason for 
court relief. Here there is no such threat. Indeed, the de-
fendant has consistently asserted that he intends to comply 
with the law as the courts have interpreted it. 
Also there is no question, and the opinion 80 concedes, 
that lawful police activity should not fall within the scope 
of the injunctive restraint sought to be imposed. It is not 
disputed that lawful police measures may often involve the 
use of microphonic equipment and recording devices. To 
issue an injunction in the present case would impose on the 
defendant the unreasonable burden of determining at his 
peril whether the use of such equipment in any situation 
would be violative of the restraining order. The existence of 
such a restraint certainly would constitute an undue inter. 
ference with the duties of a public official sworn to uphold 
and enforce the law. I would affirm the judgment. 
Spence, J., eoncurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
4, 1957. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
.c~ 
